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Newton’s Intellectual Joy 
Or  




How should one understand value or ‘goodness’? One influential answer to this 
question makes use of the notion of pleasure. Something is good if, and only if it is 
correct to take pleasure in it. The pleasure we take is itself valuable: it is correct to 
like it. It is therefore desirable to have an account of pleasure that can inform one’s 
value theory.  
Brentano’s writings contain suggestive remarks about the intentionality and 
metaphysics of pleasure that point to such an account. He distinguished between two 
fundamental kinds of pleasure: intellectual (geistiger) and sensory (sinnlicher) 
pleasure (Lust). In this paper I will approach Brentano’s conception of pleasure via 
this distinction. I want to answer the following questions: What do sensory and 
intellectual pleasures have in common, what distinguishes them? Can the distinction 
be justified? How are sensory and intellectual pleasure related to each other?  
Brentano’s work on pleasure is grounded in his reading of book X of 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in which Aristotle investigates the nature of 
pleasure.1 Aristotle took pleasure in thinking, intellectual activities broadly conceived, 
to be different in kind from pleasure in perceptual activities, watching, listening etc. 
(Brentano’s ‘sinnliche Lust’ is an echo of the second idea: it is pleasure in the 
activities of the senses (Sinne).) I will therefore start with an outline of Aristotelian 
key-ideas about pleasure and then move on to Brentano’s development of them. For 
Aristotle and Brentano, pleasure is a non-propositional attitude towards an activity. If 
one has this attitude to an activity at a time, one either performs or undergoes the 
activity at that time.  
The Brentanian view of sensory and intellectual pleasure that will emerge 
from section 2 to 4 is fundamentally different from the one Brentano’s most 
influential exegete Roderick Chisholm presented in his book Brentano on Intrinsic 
                                                        
1 See PES, 113-4 [I, 207-8] 
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Value and other works. According to Chisholm, one takes intellectual pleasure if one 
is pleased that p and this propositional attitude causes one to experience sensory 
pleasure. I will argue that Chisholm’s Brentano holds an implausible view. 
Fortunately Chisholm’s Brentano is not Brentano. While Chisholm took sensory 
pleasure to be basic in an account of nonsensory pleasure, Feldman turned the 
direction of explanation around: we need to appeal to nonsensory pleasure to say what 
sensory pleasures are. I will argue that Feldman’s view suffers from similar problems 
as Chisholm’s. The paper ends with an irenic note: neither Chisholm’s propositional 
nor Brentano’s non-propositional approach captures all nonsensory pleasures. Both 
approaches are needed. 
 
2. An Outline of Brentano’s Aristotelian Background  
Philosophers often focus on sensations and feelings when discussing pleasure. They 
start by giving examples of (un)pleasant sensations – the sensation one has when 
being massaged, the sensation of drinking a good wine etc. – and go on to ask what 
their pleasantness consist in.2 
 This approach to pleasure is foreign to Aristotle and the philosophers who 
follow him. Although anachronistic, it is helpful to start with a quote from Ryle’s 
Concept of Mind to home in on the notion of pleasure that Aristotle took to be 
important: 
 
‘Pleasure’ […] is used sometimes to denote special kinds of moods, such as 
elation, joy and amusement. […] But there is another sense in which we say 
that a person who is so absorbed in some activity, such as golf or argument, 
that he is reluctant to stop, or even to think of anything else, is ‘taking pleasure 
in’ or ‘enjoying’ doing what he is doing, though he is in no degree convulsed 
or beside himself, and though he is not, therefore, experiencing any particular 
feelings. (Ryle 1949, 104) 
 
Aristotelians are not investigating sensations that have a certain ‘feel’. The topic of 
book X of the Nichomachean Ethics is what it is to enjoy an activity such as playing 
the flute, thinking about geometrical problems, building a house or eating a good 
                                                        
2 A good example is Rachels 2000, 187. 
 3 
meal. 3 The pleasure we take in an activity completes and intensifies it. The sense of 
completion under consideration is difficult to capture. Pleasure completes an activity 
as the nice blend of tastes completes the taste of wine. 4 The enjoyment of an activity 
is not a distinct activity, but depends on the activity one takes pleasure in. In the next 
section we will see that Brentano expands on this point. The sense of intensification is 
more straightforward: If I enjoy bird watching, I will devote my attention to the 
movements of the bird and my watching will be better (more accurate, yield more 
information) than the watching of person who is no ‘lover of bird watching’. 
 Pleasure or enjoyment is present directed. One can only take pleasure in flute 
playing if one is playing the flute. There is also a dispositional sense of ‘taking 
pleasure’ in which one can be said to take pleasure in flute playing if one is disposed 
to enjoy flute playing. But this sense of enjoyment is not under consideration here.  
On one reading of Aristotle, there are two basic kinds of enjoyment: 
enjoyment of perceptual activities (perceiving) and enjoyment of intellectual activities 
(thinking). Perceptual activities are exercises of our senses; intellectual activities are 
exercises of the capacity to reason and contemplate. Bostock explains the 
fundamentality of these two kinds of enjoyment nicely: 
 
[T]he builder may enjoy seeing his wall go up so straightly and so cleanly, as 
he may also enjoy the feel of the trowel in his hand, and the bodily sensations 
produced by the effortless exercise of his muscles. He may also enjoy first 
anticipating and then contemplating the completed building. In these thoughts 
and perceptions there may be pleasure, but not in the actual process of 
building. And Aristotle’s fundamental thought here is that pleasure takes place 
in the mind, but one can hardly say this of building, any more than of eating 
and drinking. (Bostock 1988, 271) 5 
 
The builder enjoys building because he enjoys certain activities of thought – planning, 
drawing, anticipating – and perceptual activities – seeing the wall go straight up, 
                                                        
3 On the centrality of activity in Aristotle’s thought about pleasure see, for example, 
Urmson 1967, 324 and Bostock 1988. 
4 This characterization is proposed with different examples by Shields 2011, 209. 
5 Bostock 2000, 160 takes it to be difficult to make a case for it. 
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feeling the trowel – that are involved in building, that is, either building consists in 
these activities or there is a regular connection between building and these activities.  
Aristotle argued that enjoyment of intellectual activities is different in kind 
from enjoyment of perceptual activities:  
 
For things different in kind are, we think, completed by different things (we 
see this to be true both of natural objects and of things produced by art, e.g. 
animals, trees, a painting, a sculpture, a house, an implement); and, similarly, 
we think that activities differing in kind are completed by things differing in 
kind. Now the activities of thought differ from those of the senses, and among 
themselves, in kind; so, therefore, do the pleasures that complete them. (NE 
1175a1 23-28; transl. by Ross (revised by Urmson)) 
 
Intellectual activities differ in kind from perceptual activities. What does this 
difference consist in? The fundamental difference between thought or reason and 
perception concerns their intentionality. Thought can ‘become’ (represent) things of 
all kinds (see De Anima 3.5). It has no dedicated kind of object and lacks an organ to 
respond to objects of a particular kind. It is ‘unconstrained with respect to its objects’ 
(Shields 2015, 302). In contrast, perception is constrained with respect to its objects. 
There are different senses each of which responds to some kind of objects but not to 
others. Sight is of colours; hearing is of sounds etc. 
 If activities of different kinds are completed by pleasures, the completing 
pleasures are also different in kind. Hence, the pleasure that completes activities of 
thought is of different kind than the pleasure that completes perceptual activities. 
There are two fundamental kinds of pleasure: intellectual and sensory pleasure. 
Aristotle suggests further that also the exercises of different senses differ in kind. The 
pleasure one takes in bird watching is of different kind from the pleasure in hearing.  
Aristotle distinguished also between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul 
(NE III.10). Bodily pleasure is not a new kind of pleasure; it is a subspecies of 
sensory pleasure: bodily pleasure is pleasure in perceiving states of or changes in 
one’s body. Pleasures of the soul are, it seems plausible to say, pleasures of thinking 
under a different name. They are pleasures on takes in the activities distinctive of the 
soul, namely thinking and contemplating. 
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 Aristotle’s thesis that sensory and intellectual pleasures are different in kind 
raises several questions: Why does a difference in the kind of activity make for a 
difference in kind of the completing activity? What is a difference in kind in the first 
place? It would be good if we could make the core distinction plausible without 
answering these difficult questions.  
In section 4 and 5 I will try to do so by drawing on Brentano’s work. But let us 
first see how Brentano built on Aristotle. 
 
3. Brentano’s Aristotelian View of Enjoyment 
Brentano’s view of pleasure elaborates some of the suggestions made by Aristotle. 
Consider the following quote: 
  
[1.] One thing certainly has to be admitted; the object to which a feeling refers 
[bezieht] is not always an external object. [2.] Even in cases where I hear a 
harmonious sound the pleasure I feel is not actually pleasure in the sound 
[nicht eigentlich eine Lust an dem Tone], but pleasure in the hearing. [3.] In 
fact one could say not without justification that in a certain sense it [the 
pleasure] refers to itself, and that therefore what Hamilton said becomes the 
case, namely that the feeling and the object are “fused into one”. (PES, 69 [I, 
127]; my emphasis.) 
  
In 1. Brentano goes beyond Aristotle in applying the notion of intentionality to 
enjoyment: my enjoyment refers to something. Brentano’s first stab characterisation 
of intentionality is that 
 
[e]very mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, 
although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is 
presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on. (PES, 68 [I, 124-5].) 
 
The application to enjoyment is straightforward: In enjoyment something is enjoyed; 
one cannot enjoy without enjoying something.  
 In 2. Brentano falls in line with Aristotle’s view that we always enjoy 
perceptual or intellectual activities: we enjoy the hearing. But is this consistent with 
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1.? If the enjoyment does not always refer to an external object, it will at least 
sometimes refer to an external object. But Aristotle seems to deny that we enjoy 
external objects.  
The impression that 1. is inconsistent with 2. disappears if we take into 
account that Brentano qualifies in which way we enjoy an external object or process, 
for instance, the sound that I hear. Yes, we say that we enjoy an external object, but 
this is a derived or improper way of speaking.6 Properly speaking only sensory or 
intellectual activities can be enjoyed. 7 In which sense is saying that we enjoy hearing 
the music proper?  
Aristotle took many words that we use in articulating philosophical views to 
be polysemous; they have several related meanings (He spoke of ‘homonomy’). 8 
Paradigm examples are ‘is’ and ‘true’. Brentano’s first book is a study in the 
polysemy of ‘to be’: On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. A good model for 
the polysemy Brentano has in mind are the interrelated meanings of ‘healthy’. We say 
that (i) people are healthy, (ii) that someone’s complexion is healthy, (iii) that 
drinking milk is healthy, (iv) that milk is healthy and so on. The meaning of ‘healthy’ 
differs in (i) to (iv), but in order to explain or at least gloss the sense of ‘healthy’ in 
(ii) to (iv) we need to appeal to the sense it has in (i), but we don’t need to appeal to 
any of the other senses to explain the core-sense. A complexion, for example, is 
healthy, roughly speaking, if it looks like a complexion that is a natural sign of health 
in a person. Here the sense of ‘healthy’ in which the word applies to people is proper: 
activities and food products are said to be healthy with respect to people. Similarly, 
only intellectual and perceptual activities activities are enjoyed in the proper or 
primary sense. A melody is enjoyable because hearing it is enjoyable and not the 
other way round. 9 Hence, saying that one enjoys only the hearing of the melody in the 
proper sense is compatible with saying that one enjoys the melody in a derived sense. 
                                                        
6 The English translation does not make this explicit by translating the adjective 
‘eigentlich’ as the adverb ‘actually’. The German ‘eigentlich’ can mean ‘inauthentic’ 
or ‘improper’. 
7 See also Massin 2013, 331 and Mulligan 2004, 84. 
8 See Shields 2002 for a systematic study of homonymy in Aristotle.  
9 I develop and defend Brentano’s view of the proper objects of enjoyment further in 
Textor 2017, chapter 9. 
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In 3. Brentano moves again beyond Aristotle by arguing that enjoyment is 
self-directed. If one enjoys listening to flute music, one enjoys one’s enjoying 
listening to flute music and so on ad infinitum. Nonetheless, there is no infinite 
regress, argues Brentano. For one’s enjoyment of an activity is also directed on itself. 
One enjoys several activities, among them, the activity of enjoying.10  
 
4. Introducing Sensory and Intellectual Pleasure 
Aristotle described people who enjoy an activity as lovers of it.11 ‘The lover of the 
flute’ cannot focus on anything else when Jethro Tull is playing ‘Living in the Past’. 
Brentano builds on this and argues that enjoyment is nothing but liking an activity. If 
one is enjoying listening to flute music, one hears flute music and is loving or, to use 
a less loaded term, liking it:   
 
Sensory pleasure is an enjoyment [Wohlgefallen], sensory pain a disliking 
[Missfallen], that is directed on an act of sensing [Empfindungsakt] to which 
they themselves belong. (US, 177; my translation and emphasis.) 
 
One takes sensory pleasure at a time if, and only if, one likes at that time an activity 
of a sense (watching, listening, sniffing etc.) and one’s liking ‘belongs’ to the activity 
liked. One takes intellectual pleasure at a time, it seems plausible to continue, if, and 
only if, one likes at that time an activity of the intellect (proving theorems, thinking 
about puzzles etc.) and one’s liking ‘belongs’ to the activity liked. 
 In the remainder of the paper I will develop and defend a part of these 
characterisations of sensory and intellectual pleasure. I will not discuss in detail the 
role of the clause ‘to which they themselves belong’. But it is worth having a brief 
look at it. When the lover of geometry enjoys proving theorems, the activity of 
proving is not merely the causal source of pleasurable sensations.12 One cannot enjoy 
proving at a time (in a non-dispositional sense) if one is not proving something then. 
                                                        
10  See Caston (2002, 795-5) who points out one that one need not notice one’s 
enjoyment of one’s enjoyment, and that one can have further attitudes to one’s 
enjoyment: one can be repulsed by one’s enjoyment, desire not to have it, etc.  
11 See NE 1175b 2-7. 
12 Shields 2011, 194-5 sets this view up in order to refute it later. 
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However, if proving were merely the cause (a cause) of pleasurable sensations, one 
could – per impossibile – take pleasure in proving without proving, namely if the 
pleasurable sensation were brought about by a different cause. The liking and the 
activity liked are not two ‘distinct existences’. Sensory enjoyment is one activity that 
is directed on several objects – itself and a physical object – all of which it 
apprehends in different modes: it acknowledges as well as likes these objects. 
‘Enjoying listening to Jethro Tull’ is a partial description of the activity that can also 
be described as ‘listening to Jethro Tull’. Once one describes it partially with respect 
to the physical object presented, once with respect to the activity liked. We will need 
to keep this in mind in the further discussion.13  
 Let us now look in more detail at shared features of sensory and intellectual 
pleasure. According to Brentano’s initial characterization of sensory and intellectual 
pleasure, both are likings of ongoing activities of which they are part. If they are part 
of the activity in the sense explained above, one can only enjoy (take pleasure in) an 
activity or process that is ongoing when one enjoys it. Aristotle (NE 1175b1 30-35) 
spoke therefore of activity and enjoyment being close in nature and time. One cannot 
enjoy one’s future (or past) tasting a host mustard sandwich. 
A further intriguing commonality of sensory and intellectual pleasures is that 
both can be blind or evident. Consider the following quote: 
 
Sensory pleasure is an act of sensing directed on a certain sensory, localized 
quality and which possesses in our secondary consciousness not only the 
character of presenting and acknowledgement [Anerkennens], but also of 
intense love. To be sure, this loving is in itself purely instinctive and blind, yet 
it belongs to the class of objects which motivate [motivieren] a correctly 
characterised [richtig charakterisiert] love when they are presented in general 
[im allgemeinen vorstellen]. (FCA, 118 [186], my emphasis. I have changed 
the translation.) 
 
This quote brings out why one needs to take into account that enjoying hearing the 
flute and hearing the flute are the same activity under different descriptions. For 
Brentano talks sometimes as if sensory pleasure is directed on physical qualities, 
                                                        
13 I have tried to do so in chapter 11 of Textor 2017. 
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sometimes on perceptual activities. Both are correct partial descriptions: the sensory 
enjoyment is directed on both the physical quality and the perceptual activity to which 
the enjoyment belongs. As mentioned before, we must take into account that physical 
objects and activities can both be enjoyed, but the former only in a derived or 
improper sense. The quality is enjoyed in a derived; the perceptual activity in the 
primary sense.  
What are blind, what are evident sensory pleasures? In general, the distinction 
between blind and evident activities cannot be explained in more fundamental terms. 
It needs to be acquired by considering examples. Brentano encouraged his reader to 
compare the enjoyment of smoking a good cigar with the pleasure one takes in 
listening to a Beethoven symphony. The pleasure one takes in smoking a good cigar is 
a blind sensory pleasure, the pleasure one takes in listening to a Beethoven symphony 
is an evident one. The distinction between blind and evident enjoyment applies to 
sensory as well as to intellectual enjoyment. 14  The enjoyment of inquiring is an 
evident intellectual enjoyment, the enjoyment of reading the news a blind intellectual 
enjoyment. 
Can we clarify this distinction further so to get a better grip on it? Brentano 
characterized an evident judgement as judgement that ‘declares itself to be correct’.15 
When we make such a self-evident judgement we are aware of our judging as well as 
of its correctness. An evident judging is a judging whose correctness cannot escape 
you when you are aware of making it: the judgement is not only correct; it is 
characterized as correct. 16  In the case of my judgement that everything is self-
identical the judgement strikes me as correct, although I cannot give independent 
reasons for its truth (ibid.). Similarly, if you are aware of your enjoyment of listening 
to the Beethoven symphony (or, strictly speaking, to a temporal part of it as it unfolds 
over time) you have a sense that your enjoyment is appropriate to its object. If you are 
aware of your enjoyment, you are also aware of the correctness of your enjoyment. It 
strikes you as correct to enjoy your hearing: enjoying is what one ought to do with 
respect to this perceptual activity.  
                                                        
14 See FCA, 118 [186]. 
15 See LRU, 141. 
16 OKRW, 19-20 [18–19]. 
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In contrast to my judgement that everything is self-identical my perception of 
a read square is blind because it is not characterised as correct. When it seems to me 
that there is red square in front of me, I am so constituted that I will acknowledge a 
red square if I am not aware of evidence that my senses deceive me. My belief-
forming mechanisms make me acknowledge a red square in front of me, ‘although 
there is nothing which characterises the acknowledging judgement as correct’ 
(OKRW, 20 [19]; my translation). Similarly, a blind love is the manifestation of an 
acquired disposition or instinct. It is human nature to like some things; it is part of our 
personality to have acquired dispositions to like some activities and not others. For 
instance, I am disposed to enjoy tasting hot mustard sandwiches. I love tasting them 
neither for the reason that it is correct to love it nor for the reason that I should do so 
because it furthers my interests. I do so out of a natural inclination. 
With this in mind, let us answer the questions posed in the introduction: 
What do sensory and intellectual pleasures have in common, what distinguishes 
them? Both sensory and intellectual pleasures are likings of activities: sensory 
pleasure is liking a perceptual activity; intellectual pleasures liking an intellectual 
activity such as proving or contemplating. The distinction between intellectual 
pleasures and sensory pleasure seems ‘shallow. The only distinction between sensory 
pleasure and intellectual pleasure concerns the kinds of activity they are directed on. 
This observation raises an exegetical problem. Aristotle held that sensory and 
intellectual pleasures are themselves different in kind. So far we have no reason to 
follow Aristotle in this point. Yes, enjoying proving theorems and enjoying listening 
to flute music have different objects. But they are the same kind of mental act. Why 
and how should a difference in the object enjoyed make the first enjoyment different 
in kind from the second? In the next section I will reconstruct Brentano’s answer to 
this question.  
 
5. The Distinction between Sensory and Intellectual Pleasure  
I take my clue from one of the few criticisms that Brentano made of Aristotle: 
 
Already [schon] Aristotle surmised [kommt auf die Vermutung] in the final 
book of the Nichomachian Ethics that the feeling of pleasure accompanying 
our intellectual activities [geistigen Akte] belong to them naturally, but are not 
given in them [aber nicht in ihnen selbst gegeben sein]. But he never 
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sufficiently investigated the problem of intensities, and did not go into further 
detail. (LH, 155 [162]; I have changed the translation.) 
 
The claim Brentano ascribes to Aristotle is difficult to pin down precisely in book X 
of Nichomachian Ethics. I propose therefore to ignore the reference to Aristotle and 
focus on the distinction Brentano wants to draw. Both intellectual and sensory 
pleasure accompany their activities and belong naturally to them, but only the sensory 
pleasures are given in the sensory activities. What does that mean? Brentano points us 
to the notion of intensity as the clue to understand this point.  
 Let’s start with the clue: intensity. Every sensory enjoyment has a degree of 
intensity; we intuitively conceive of enjoyments as stronger or weaker, as having 
more or less force. I enjoy tasting hot mustard sandwiches to a higher degree than 
sandwiches without hot mustard. Brentano made an important assumption about such 
degrees of intensity. A mental activity can only have a degree of intensity if it has 
spatial parts or it is directed on an object that has spatial parts. 17  Consider, for 
example, seeing a colour. The intensity of my seeing depends, Brentano argues, on 
how dense the space I perceive is filled with coloured parts. The more parts of the 
space are filled with a particular colour, say redness, the higher the intensity of my 
seeing of redness.  
Why does temporal extension either of object or act not suffice for the 
possession of intensity? As far as I know Brentano did not answer this question. But 
he could have given the following answer: An enjoyment at a time has a degree of 
intensity at that time. Neither the enjoyment nor its object needed to be temporally 
extended to have this degree of intensity. Hence, possession of an intensity does not 
depend on temporal extension. 
Brentano’s conception of intensity gives rise to a number of questions. Is the 
mereological account of intensity independently plausible?18 If not, are there other 
reasons to say that intellectual pleasure has no intensity? I will not address these 
                                                        
17 See LH, 155 [161–2], US, 134-5. 
18  Stumpf 1917, 35 takes Brentano to replace intensity with a different measure. 
Stumpf 1917 § 6 gives a good overview of the debate about intensity of visual 
sensations at the end of the 19th century. 
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questions here. My aim is to see whether Brentano can draw a distinction between 
sensory and intellectual pleasure by appealing to the notion of intensity. 
On Brentano’s conception of intensity some mental acts can have no intensity. 
Mental acts themselves at least seem not to be extended in space, mental acts have no 
spatial parts. So a mental act can only have an intensity if it is directed on an extended 
object. Any mental act whose object is not extended cannot have an intensity. Since 
intellectual enjoyment is not directed on something that has spatial parts. 19  For 
example, when I enjoy contemplating the form of the Good, neither the object I take 
pleasure in, my contemplation, nor my enjoyment has spatial parts. Hence, by 
Brentano’s lights, this intellectual pleasure can have no intensity. In contrast, one of 
the objects of a sensory pleasure is always spatially extended: a colour trope etc. All 
sensory pleasures have therefore a degree of intensity.  
This way of drawing the distinction between sensory and intellectual pleasure 
implements Aristotle’s idea that pleasure differ in kind because they have objects of 
different kinds. The pleasures in sensory activities are pleasures in activities that have 
intensities and therefore the pleasures have intensities; intellectual pleasures can’t. I 
don’t know whether this distinction justifies one to think of sensory and intellectual 
pleasure as different in kind. For we are not given enough information about what a 
difference in kind amounts to. But it is a distinction that has theoretical consequences 
as we will see in the next section. 
 
6. How can an Intellectual Enjoyment have a Degree of Intensity? 
A pressing problem for Brentano’s attempt to distinguish between sensory and 
intellectual pleasure are prima facie examples of intense intellectual enjoyment. 
Brentano’s example is Newton’s joy: 20 
 
When Newton read the results of the new astronomical measurements that 
confirmed his hypothesis, joy overwhelmed him more and more in such a way 
that he was not able to continue reading. (LH, 155 [162]) 
                                                        
19 Is enjoyment of geometry an intellectual pleasure? If it is, there seems to be a form 
of intellectual pleasure that can have intensity.  
20 The Newton example is frequently referred to in the literature on pleasure. See 
Feldman 1988, 67-8 and Lemos 1994, 71 
 13 
Brentano does not give us many details about Newton’s intellectual rapture. 
Fortunately for us pleasure at discovery is common in great scientists. The following 
description of Einstein’s pleasure when he discovered the theory of relativity has 
more detail: 
 
Einstein felt all the pure wonder of that perfect match between theory and 
reality. Working at this desk, some time before he rose before the Academy, 
the correct answer appeared as he cranked through the final steps. It was 
when, he told a friend, his heart actually shuddered in his chest – genuine 
palpitations. He wrote it was as if something had snapped in him, and told 
another friend that he was “besides himself with joy.” (Levenson 2015, 172-3; 
my emphasis.) 
 
Einstein took intellectual pleasure in recognising the truth of his hypotheses. Prima 
facie, his intellectual pleasure had a high degree of intensity; ‘he is besides himself 
with joy’.  
 Such intensive intellectual pleasures pose a challenge for the combination of 
Brentano’s view of intellectual pleasure with his view about the nature of intensity. In 
order to meet the challenge we need, Brentano says, take into account that we ‘say in 
two ways that someone enjoys something’: 
 
One can say in two ways that someone enjoys, or takes pleasure, unpleasure, 
or displeasure in something. One says it in one way if something is the object 
of this direction of the emotion [Gemütsrichtung]. But one says it also if one 
takes pleasure or unpleasure in another object but the pleasure or unpleasure in 
it is stirred while simultaneously the other is enjoyed or one takes unpleasure 
in it because one takes pleasure [or] displeasure in the former. Only in this way 
can one say that that one takes intensive pleasure or displeasure in the 
intellectual [an Geistigem]; for all that is intensive requires continuity and 
spatial extension, either in itself or in its objects. When Newton read the 
results of the new astronomical measurements that confirmed his hypothesis, 
joy overwhelmed him more and more in such a way that he was not able to 
continue reading. He was subject to most vehement sensory affects of pleasure 
that were linked to intellectual pleasure as redundancies. Similarly, 
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Archimedes felt as thought he was inebriated when calling out his eureka and 
a pleasure that is tied to the awareness of virtue and vice is often accompanied 
by powerful sensory affects. (LH, 155 [161–2]; my translation and emphasis) 
 
I have re-translated parts of this passage. I will make clear why in the next section.  
 Brentano claims we say in two ways that someone enjoys something. What are 
these two ways? Consider an independent example taken from the literature on 
polysemy.21 In  
 
 The window was boarded up 
 
we use ‘the window’ to refer to the glass in the window opening. In  
 
 The window was broken 
 
we use the same word to refer to window opening. We might easily find other 
examples in which ‘the window’ with its linguistic meaning unchanged is used to 
refer to things related to window openings and/or fillings of the openings.  
 According to Brentano, we find something similar with complements of 
‘enjoy’. When we report someone’s enjoyment the same words used to specify the 
object of the enjoyment can refer to different things without change in meaning. Let’s 
illustrate it with a related example.22 Consider my report: 
 
I enjoyed drinking absinthe last night. 
 
This report may be true although I mainly enjoyed the effects of my drinking the 
absinthe – the fuzzy glow of warmth caused by imbibing absinthe, the jolly mood – 
and only to some extent my actual drinking it, e.g. my putting it in my mouth, tasting 
it etc. However, the report would not be true if I did not also enjoy the actual 
drinking. Just as in the window examples, we have here a case of transfer or 
broadening of reference of ‘drinking absinth’ from the original referent – drinking 
                                                        
21 I take the example from Nunberg 1979, 148. 
22 I am grateful to Jessica Leech for improving the example. 
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absinthe – to a prominent effect of it – the sensation and mood – which may last 
longer than the drinking.  To make this plausible consider: 
 
I enjoyed drinking absinthe last night. It was a great experience. 
 
The actual drinking was not a great experience, yet some of its effects may deserve to 
be called so. 
 Brentano holds that the mechanism just outlined is also at work when we say 
that Newton’s and Einstein’s intellectual pleasure was intense. Newton’s and 
Einstein’s intellectual enjoyment caused them to take sensory pleasure in a sensory 
activity. Einstein, for example, took intensive sensory pleasure in perceiving states of 
his body and this sensory enjoyment is caused by and overlaps in time with his 
intellectual enjoyment. Hence, one can truly say  
 
 Einstein took intense pleasure in discovering Relativity. 
 
The enjoyment we talk about is or includes the sensory enjoyment caused by the 
intellectual enjoyment. Since the caused sensory enjoyment was intense we can truly 
say that the pleasure was intense, without contradicting the view that intellectual 
pleasure lack intensity. We can compare this to saying: 
 
 I greatly enjoyed drinking absinth last night. 
 
The enjoyment may be great not because I greatly enjoyed the actual drinking, but 
because I enjoyed the drinking to some degree and I greatly enjoyed its effects on me: 
the sensations caused were immensely enjoyable. In the same way talk of intensive 
intellectual pleasure is talk about the intensity of the sensory pleasure caused by the 
intellectual pleasure or of the intensity of their combination.23  
 The view that many of our words are referentially flexible is independently 
plausible. Hence, Brentano’s claim that the words we use to specify the object of our 
enjoyment are referentially flexible is promising. However, he will need to show that 
whenever we find it plausible to say that there was an intense pleasure in an 
                                                        
23 On this form of transfer see PES 65 [I, 119]. 
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intellectual activity, the words we use to specify the object of the pleasure refer to 
effects of the activity or the activity. In this paper I will not assess whether Brentano 
can capture all examples of intense intellectual pleasure. For I am mainly interested in 
how Chisholm (mis)read the last quotation and turned it into an influential reductive 
account of intellectual pleasure. In the next section I will therefore turn to the so-
called ‘Brentano-Chisholm’ view. 
 
7. The ‘Brentano-Chisholm View’ of Intellectual Pleasure 
Brentano used the example of Newton’s intellectual pleasure as a counter-example of 
the combination of his view of intellectual pleasure with a particular take on intensity. 
The example is used to illustrate his response to this problem, but not to motivate a 
thesis about the nature of intellectual pleasure. In contrast, Chisholm (1986, 30) 
interprets the example as suggesting a reductive account of intellectual pleasure. To 
see why consider Chisholm and Schneewind’s translation of a part of the passage 
discussed in the previous section: 
 
When Newton read that his astronomical hypotheses had been confirmed by 
new measurements, his joy became more and more intense and he was finally 
so overcome that he could no longer continue reading. He succumbed to the 
intensive sensuous pleasure which had redounded from his higher feelings.  
 
Chisholm takes this to suggest that a higher feeling becomes an intellectual pleasure 
when intensive sensuous pleasure ‘redounds’ from it (More about this in due course). 
However, the German text does not suggest this reading. The German is: 
 
Er [Newton] unterlag offenbar den heftigsten sinnlichen Affekten der Lust, 
welche als Redundanzen an ein geistiges Gefallen sich knüpfte. 
 
Brentano does not talk of a ‘higher feelings’, only about intellectual pleasure 
[geistiges Gefallen]. Newton experiences intellectual pleasure. There is already 
intellectual pleasure and it does not need the sensory pleasure or anything else to be 
turned into one. The sensory pleasures do not ‘redound’ from the intellectual one. 
There is no ‘redounding’, the sensory pleasure is a ‘Redundanz’ it is an add-on; it is 
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redundant. Brentano wants to explain away the Newton example as a problem for his 
theory of intensity; he does not take it to suggest an account of intellectual pleasure.  
Be that as it may, let us have a look at what Chisholm makes of Brentano’s 
remarks on the intensity of intellectual pleasure. According to Chisholm, intellectual 
pleasure – in Chisholm’s terminology ‘nonsensory pleasure’ – is a propositional 
attitude: 
 
Nonsensory pleasure and pain are instances of what are sometimes called 
propositional attitudes. (Chisholm 1986, 27) 
 
We say that we are pleased that something is the case:  
 
John was pleased that Mary came to the party. 
John was pleased that the delivery arrived on time. 
 
But are the propositional attitudes reported here what Brentano called ‘intellectual 
enjoyments’? As an exegesis or reconstruction this is implausible. I agree with Olson 
(2003, 139) that speaking of propositional attitudes in this connection ‘would be alien 
to Brentano’. For example, it is false to say that Brentano held ‘that a person’s love of 
some state of affairs may cause him to experience sensory pleasure’ (Feldman 1988, 
68). For Brentano, love is not a propositional attitude; one does not love that p. It is a 
non-propositional attitude: one loves objects, in particular one’s own activities. 
 Now, Chisholm takes the Newton example to suggest that a nonsensory or 
intellectual pleasure is a propositional attitude that causes sensory pleasures: 
 
What Brentano calls the nonsensory pleasure is not the sensory pleasure itself, 
nor is it the love or approval one then has for the combined experience – that 
of contemplating the intentional object of the belief and having the resultant 
sensory pleasure. The nonsensory pleasure consists in the love or approval one 
then has for the intentional object of belief and having the resultant sensory 
pleasure. (Chisholm 1986, 30) 
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One loves that p and this causes one to experiences sensory pleasure, where, roughly 
speaking, one experiences sensory pleasure when one loves a sensing.24  Lemos’s 
comment brings out the point of this idea: 
 
What makes nonsensory pleasures pleasures is the sensory pleasure that 
redounds on certain other psychological states … (Lemos 1994, 71) 
 
A propositional attitude is not in itself a pleasure; only sensory pleasures are real 
pleasure. Hence, only if the propositional attitude causes a sensory pleasure it 
becomes an intellectual pleasure.  
Let us start by noting that Chisholm misconstrues Brentano. According to 
Brentano, intellectual pleasure is a love of an intellectual activity like contemplating 
the forms and not another thing. I can enjoy contemplating the forms whether or not 
my enjoyment causes sensory pleasure. Brentano argued, expressed in current 
terminology, that we can only ascribe intensity to an intellectual pleasure if we take 
its object to be a process that includes effects of the intellectual activity, namely 
perceptions we take pleasure in. However, an intellectual pleasure is a pleasure 
independently of whether or not it causes a sensory pleasure. Only qualifying it as 
intense depends on the causation of a sensory pleasure. 
Feldman (1988, 68) summed Chisholm’s (mis)interpretation up as follows: 
 
 S takes propositional pleasure in p at t =  
S’s love of (the state of affairs that) p at t causes S to experience sensory 
pleasure at t. 
 
This definition is sometimes called the ‘Brentano–Chisholm view [of nonsensory 
pleasure]’. If the Brentano–Chisholm view is right, sensory pleasure is metaphysically 
fundamental: only a propositional attitude that causes such a pleasure is an intellectual 
pleasure. 
                                                        
24 See Chisholm 1986, 26. I take Chisholm to be wrong about the primary object of 
sensory pleasure, but cannot argue this point in detail here. See my 2017, chapter 
10.2. 
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 It should by now be clear that the ‘Brentano–Chisholm’ view is not 
Brentano’s view. But even though it is not Brentano’s view, it may be a promising 
view of intellectual pleasure? However, there are two immediate problems for the 
‘Brentano–Chisholm’ view. 
First, it is unclear how the causation of a sensory pleasure should transform 
something which is not a pleasure into one. Compare: my kicking the wall may cause 
an injury. But it does not make the cause, the kicking, an injury. 
 Second, one can, it seems, be pleased that p and this propositional attitude can 
be a genuine pleasure, although it does not cause a sensory pleasure. Feldman (1988, 
67) consider the example of motorcyclist who has been anaesthetized after an 
accident. He neither feels sensory pain nor sensory pleasure.  
 
 He may nevertheless be pleased to find that he is still alive. (ibid) 
 
The fact that his pleasure that he is alive does not cause a sensory pleasure seems 
simply irrelevant.  
 
8. Feldman on Sensory and Attitudinal Pleasure 
While Chisholm’s Brentano takes sensory pleasure to be conceptually fundamental 
and needed in the explanation of nonsensory pleasure, Feldman turns the direction of 
explanation around: nonsensory pleasure is needed in the explanation of sensory 
pleasure. In this section I will discuss the direction of explanation that takes 
nonsensory pleasure to be conceptually basic. To anticipate: neither direction of 
explanation seems promising. Sensory and intellectual pleasures are both pleasures, 
but neither is conceptually prior to the other.  
In order to assess Feldman’s proposal, let’s first get clear about the notion of 
sensory pleasure he uses. According to him, sensations are pleasant or pleasure 
giving.25 Sensations are feelings: Feldman gives as an example the ‘all-over bodily 
feeling of warmth’. These feelings are sensory pleasures: 
 
A person experiences sensory pleasure at a time if he feels pleasurable 
sensations then. If you like the tastes of champagne, you might experience 
                                                        
25 Feldman 1988, 60. 
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sensory pleasure as you sip a cool glass of your favorite and nibble on caviar. 
[…] The point here, however, is that sensory pleasures are ‘feelings’ – things 
relevantly like feelings of heat and cold; feelings of pressure, tickles, and 
itches, the feeling you get in your back when getting a massage. (Feldman 
2004, 55-6) 
 
In Feldman’s classification of pleasure, ‘intellectual pleasure’ or ‘pleasure of the 
mind’ is not mentioned. He talks about propositional (Feldman 1988) or attitudinal 
pleasure (Feldman 2004). However, these pleasures seem to be the closest successors 
to Brentano’s intellectual pleasure. Feldman argues that propositional pleasure is 
conceptually fundamental in understanding pleasure: 
 
 [W]hat makes a feeling be a sensory pleasure, in my view, is the fact that the 
person who feels it takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the fact that he 
himself is then feeling it. (Feldman 2004, 57) 
 
What recommends this definition of sensory pleasure?  
If we define sensory pleasure as Feldman proposes to do, we can solve the 
‘heterogeneity puzzle’ (Feldman 2004, 79). What is this puzzle? Compare the 
pleasure you take in smoking a good cigar with the pleasure you take in being 
massaged. Is there a particular feeling that is common to both and in which your 
taking pleasure consists? Feldman reports: 
 
After many years of careful research on this question, I have come to the 
conclusion that they have nothing in common phenomenologically. Yet they 
are both pleasures. Why? (Feldman 2004, 79) 
 
Because we take the same propositional attitude to their occurrence. What makes all 
of these heterogeneous feelings sensory pleasures is that one is (intrinsically) pleased 
that one feels them.26 If Feldman’s solution is right – sensory pleasures are ‘feelings 
in which the feeler takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure’ (ibid) – there can be no sensory 
                                                        
26 See Feldman 2004, 57. 
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pleasure without the subject of the pleasure being pleased that she herself is feeling 
the pleasure.27  
What about people who are utterly absorbed in an activity that provides them 
with sensory pleasure? Feldman argues that although they are not aware that they 
enjoy (are glad) that they themselves have certain feelings, they still take attitudinal 
pleasure in this fact. Why? Because if someone were to ask them, they would 
immediately recognize that they are taking pleasure in their feelings.28  
In the right circumstances a person who takes sensory pleasure will, if suitably 
prompted and reflective, also be pleased that she herself has the pleasureable feelings. 
But this does not show that one cannot take sensory pleasure in something without 
being pleased that one feels this feeling. If you ask me whether my students are aliens, 
I will, ceteris paribus, immediately answer NO. But this does not show, as Audi 
argues, that I already believed that they are not aliens.29 It shows that I had standing 
disposition to acquire such a belief when suitably prompted, but a disposition to 
acquire a belief is not itself a belief. Feldman’s defense of the view that person 
immersed in an activity takes attitudinal pleasure fails for the same reason. The 
person who is immersed in her activity and takes sensory pleasure is disposed, when 
questioned, to immediately form an attitudinal pleasure. All she needs to do is to 
reflect on how things are for her and respond to the question posed. But a disposition 
to form an attitudinal pleasure when prompted is not itself an attitudinal pleasure. 
Hence, there are plausible cases of sensory pleasure without (intrinsic) attitudinal 
pleasure. If there are such cases, Feldman’s theory of sensory pleasure is implausible. 
Sensory and nonsensory pleasure are different kinds of pleasure; neither is 
conceptually prior to the other.30 
 
9. Divide and Conquer 
A common feature of both Chisholm’s and Feldman’s theories of pleasure is that 
nonsensory pleasure is identified with the propositional attitude of being pleased or 
                                                        
27 See ibid. 
28 See ibid, 58. 
29 See Audi 1982, 116f. 
30 Consequently we need a different response to the heterogeneity puzzle. See Crisp 
2006, 628f for an alternative answer. 
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being glad that p. According to these philosophers, we take pleasure in states of 
affairs or facts. If it is a fact that p, and you are glad that p, you take attitudinal 
pleasure in the fact that p.31 In contrast, Brentano argued that intellectual enjoyment is 
not enjoyment of a fact. It is an enjoyment of an activity.  
Now, one might propose that enjoyment of an activity is just the enjoyment of 
particular facts concerning the activity. In more general form: 
 
For any intellectual activity ϕ: S enjoys ϕ-ing if, and only if, there is a fact p, 
such that S is pleased that p 
 
Take enjoying proving a theorem. According to reductive proposal, my intellectual 
pleasure in proving it consists in being pleased that p, for some fact p. But which fact? 
There seems to be no non-arbitrary answer to this question. The most plausible 
candidate is that I am glad about the fact that I undergo or perform the activity. For 
instance, I am I enjoying proving a theorem if, and only if, I am pleased about the fact 
that I am proving a theorem. The problem here is that when I unreflectively enjoy 
proving a theorem, all I think about are the steps in the proof, etc. The same 
considerations that counted against Feldman’s view of sensory pleasure apply in this 
case: we have no reason to say that enjoying an activity requires enjoying a fact 
concerning the activity. In sum: enjoying an activity is not enjoying the fact that one 
undergoes or performs it.  
In turn, being pleased that p or being glad that p are propositional attitudes that 
cannot be reduced to forms of enjoyment of activities. Consider an example of 
propositional pleasure: 
 
I am pleased that Iceland did well in the European Championships. 
 
My propositional pleasure is a dispositional state with a temporal extension. If one 
holds that there is only non-propositional enjoyment, one needs to explain the 
propositional pleasure away. One needs to find for every case of propositional 
pleasure a corresponding intellectual activity that is the ‘proper’ object of enjoyment: 
 
                                                        
31 See Feldman 2004, 56. 
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 S is pleased that p if, and only if, S enjoys ϕ-ing that p. 
 
Prima facie, plausible fillers for ‘ϕ-ing’ are activities that result in belief or 
knowledge that p such as learning, finding out or discovering. However, such an 
attempt to ‘explain away’ propositional pleasure fails for two reasons. 
 First, Taylor (1963, 8) points out that enjoying an activity and propositional 
pleasure differ with respect to their temporal properties. I was truly pleased that 
Iceland did well in the European Championships for the last week or so, but I can 
only enjoy learning/finding out that Iceland did well in the European Championship at 
and for the time when I found out, say Monday morning at 11. My punctiform 
enjoyment of finding out that Iceland did well in the European Championships is long 
gone, while my propositional pleasure lasts. One can attempt to modify the original 
idea to take this point into account: 
 
S is pleased that p if, and only if, there was or is a time t at which S enjoyed ϕ-
ing that p. 
 
The modification sets the bar for propositional pleasure too low: I was once pleased to 
find out that p. But time has moved on and I am no longer pleased that p. Past 
enjoyment of finding out does not guarantee present enjoyment of fact. 
Second, I may enjoy finding out facts, but when I have found them out not 
take propositional pleasure in the facts I found out. Imagine you are a physicist who 
worked for a long time on hard problem. You may truly report after your discovery of 
the solution: 
 
I enjoyed discovering that E = MC2, but I am not pleased that E = MC2. 
 
The pleasure is one of discovering the fact, I don’t love or am pleased that E = MC2. 
 Taking pleasure in an activity is one thing, taking pleasure in a fact another. 
Brentano describes the first kind of pleasure, Chisholm and Feldman the second kind. 






Sensory and intellectual pleasures are for Brentano two non-propositional attitudes 
that are directed on activities of different kinds. The basic difference is the difference 
between perceptual and intellectual activities and this difference grounds a difference 
in the intensity of the enjoyment in these activities.  
Both Chisholm and Feldman ignore that enjoyment is for Brentano non-
propositional. They replace Brentano’s distinction between likings of different kinds 
of activities (sensory and intellectual) with a distinction between feelings (Feldman) 
and sensory pleasures (Chisholm) on the one hand and the propositional attitude of 
being pleased that p on the other hand. For them, sensory and non-sensory pleasures 
are not phenomena of the same fundamental kind.32 It is hard to see why one should 
think of being pleased that p and a pleasurable feeling as different species of a 
common kind. Both Chisholm and Feldman respond to this problem by inter-defining 
the different ‘pleasures’. Chisholm defines propositional pleasure in terms of sensory 
pleasure (the so-called ‘Brentano–Chisholm view’); Feldman sensory pleasure in term 
of propositional pleasure. Neither definition is motivated; both are refuted by counter-
examples.  
Brentano’s view of pleasure is neither superior not inferior to the so-called 
‘Brentano–Chisholm view’. Brentano simply deals with a different phenomenon: the 
enjoyment of intellectual and perceptual activities. A satisfactory theory of pleasure 
must have room for such enjoyment and since it is not a propositional attitude, for 
non-propositional attitudes as well. Philosophers have ignored non-propositional 
intellectual pleasure for a long time. Brentano gives us good reasons to pay attention 
to them. 33  The lesson we can take from Brentano is that there are pleasures in 
activities that cannot be reduced to propositional and sensory pleasures and that these 
pleasures need separate treatment. Brentano provided us with some of the conceptual 
resources to start theorising about such pleasures. 
                                                        
32 Massin 2014, 316 discusses this point in more detail.  
33 I am grateful to all participants of the seminar on pleasure in the summer term 2016 
in King’s College for discussion. Special thanks to Joachim Aufderheide, David 
Owens, Anthony Price, Christopher Taylor and Jake Wojtowicz. I am also grateful 
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